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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code 78-2-2- (H). 
Appellant moves that this Court consider his petition and 
relief. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Due process of law 
2. Ineffective Counsel 
3. Jurisdiction 
k. Equal protection 
1 
NATUxRE OF CASE 
Appellant, George W. Elwood is an inmate at the Utah State Prison. 
Appellant plead guilty to the charges of sexual abuse of a child, 
(2 counts), and was sentenced to two concurrent terms of an indeter-
minate sentence of 1-15 years each. 
The Honorable Judge Venoy Christoffersen, of the 1st Judicial 
District, County of Cache, State of Utah presided at both trial and 
sentencing. 
During this time the Cache County Attorney was Lanny Franklin 
Gunnell, who is now a 1st District Judge. 
The Deputy County Attorney who prosecuted the case James C. Jenkins 
who in concert with Mr. Gunnell purported to have the legal authority 
required by law to prosecute the Appellant. 
Appellant was sentenced on May 21, 1987 and committed to the Utah 
State j^ rison on May 22, 1987. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On May 25, 1989, former Federal Judge and Professor of law, David 
R. Daines filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court Case No. 
87-NC-G8IW, wherein he had discovered that neither Gunnell or Jenkins 
were properly legally seated in their respective posititions. 
Both Gunnell and Jenkins were never properly constituted in that 
they had not been properly appointed in writing, sworn into office nor 
had the appropriate documents been filed to validate their authority 
prior to the time Appellant had been arrested, tried and sentenced. 
Specifically, the Appellant alleges that L. F. Gunnell was elected 
Cache County Attorney on January I, 1979 and was re-elected in 1983 
and 1987. 
It is further alleged that Mr. Gunnell never filed the report 
owed for the I979-I9S2, nor did he file a written oath or a per se 
letter to terminate 1983-86, and only in 1987 did Mr Gunnell file the 
proper oath. 
2 
Mr, Jenkins was not appointed nor did he file the required oath 
as Deputy County Attorney for 1983 or 1987 terms. 
Based on these facts a petition was filed in the Third Judicial 
District which now has jurisdiction of Appellant. 
The petition was dismissed without a hearing on September 21f 1989. 
3, 
SUMMAfff OF ARGUMENT 
The Appellant has the Constitutional light to be prosecuted by 
individuals who have been properly appointed and oathed, and those 
appointments and oaths properly filed for public record. 
When the binding of oath to support the United States and State of 
Utah Constitutions failed to occur, these legal deficiencies present 
themselves. 
1. The 1st District Judicial Court, County of Cache failed to 
constitute proper jurisdiction. That Court at the time of arrest 
prosceution and sentencing was legally and lawfully deficient to acquire 
proper jurisdiction of Appellant Elwood due to the deficiencies of both 
the prosecuting Attorney and his Deputy, Documents they initialed were 
invalid. 
2. Constititional protections guarantees like treatment of all 
those similarly situated. When the violations of both Utah Codes and 
the Constitutions of both the State of Utah and the U.S. Constitution 
occured, Appellant Elwood was denied equal protection under the law. 
3. Constitutional protections of Due Jrrocess of Law couldn't be 
more evident. Appellant's rights to due process were both impaired and 
denigrated. 
The officials who prosecuted Appellant could not legally prosecute 
persons arrested and facing criminal charges. All such action are null 
and void. 
The resulting form of local govcrance from which Appellants 
incarceration arose was a de facto system outside the rule of law. 
That system that prosecuted Appellant was not within judicially in-
terpreted Constitutional principles. 
The entire Cache County system was an infringement of criminal 
laws, self serving acts by officials at the expense of it's citizens. 
Logan Attorney, Robert Gutke, who defended Appellant, in his 
defense of Steven Ray James requested a new trial for James because the 
Deputy County Attorney of Cache County had not filed his required oath 
of office. He stated that the Deputy Prosecutor could not legally 
prosecute his client. 
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If Mr James could not legally be prosected by those prosecutors 
then neither toof could they prosecute Appellant Elwood. 
5 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I Jurisdiction 
Utah Code Ann, § I7-I6-7 (supp. 1989) states: 
"Until the appointment of a Deputy 
is made in writting and an oath taken, 
a deputy is not a Deputy1.1 
Jurisdictional Deficiency could not be more clear. 
They had not the legal authority to proceed. 
POINT II Equal protection as provided under the I^ -th Amendement were 
denied Appellant. Under Section I. of the I^ th Amendment it states: 
"nor shall any person be denied the 
equal protection of the law? 
POINT III Due process of law 
Article VI of the Constitution of the United States says 
that: 
"Judicial officers, both of the 
United States and of the several 
States, shall be bound by oath or 
affirmation, to support this con-
stitution" 
Article IV Section 10, of the Utah Constitution also requires 
a legal appointment in writing, an oath and proper filing. 
Utah Criminal Code 76-8-203 says; 
" A person is guilty of unofficial 
misconduct if he excuses or attempts 
to exercise any of the function of a 
public office when: 
(A.) He has not taken and filed 
the required oath of office: or 
(c) He has not been elected or 
appointed to office. 
63 A Am Jur 2d from Public Officers and Employees S 130 states: 
"A public officer who at the end 
of his term or office is again 
chosen for the office must generally 
qualify for his new term by furnishing 
the required bond, taking an oath of 
office or preforming whatever other 
acts may be necessary to qualify him for 
the same position? 
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AT § 131. 
"the prescribed oath of office may 
be enacted of every public officer, 
whether Federal, State, County or 
Municipal? 
See: Bond V Floyd 385 U.S. Il6, 17 L ED 2d 235, 87 S. GT 
339 also, see Oklahoma City V Oklahoma R. Co. 20 Okla. I, 
93 P ^ 8. 
Court stated that the Federal (or State) judisiary would be justified 
in testing the exclusion by federal constitution standards. 
In Gomillion V Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (i960) the court 
stated: 
"When a state exercises power wholly 
within the domain of state interest, 
it is insulated from federal judicial 
review, But, such insulation is not 
carried over when state power is used 
as an instrument for circumventing a 
federally protected right'.' 
364 U.S. at 347. 
In Bond V Floyd, the state on page 130 and 131 further states: 
"There can be no doubt as to the 
constitutionality of the quaification 
involved in this case because it is 
imposed on the state legislators by 
Article VI of the United States con-
stitution? and moreover; 
"the state contends that no decision 
of this court suggests that a state 
may not ensure the loyalty of it's 
public servants by making the taking 
of an oath a qualification of office? 
From the Federalist, No. 60, P. *K)9 (Cooke ed. I96l) on page 136 it says: 
"the qualification of the person who 
may choose to be choosen—are defined 
and fixed by the constitution; and are 
UNALTERABLE by the legislature? 
In addition both judges Bell and Morgan writing for the majority of the 
court reasoned that; "separation-of-powers principals gave the legislature 
power to insist on qualifications in addition to those specified in 
the state constitution? 
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In Oklahoma City V. Oklahoma B. Co.
 t (Supreme Court of Oklahoma 
1907) it wrote: 
,§
 It was obvious intention of the 
constitution, not only to prohibit 
public officers of the state from re-
ceiving from corporations privileges of 
favors that might improperly influence 
them in the discharge of their duties, 
but also that the general public should 
have equal facilities and conveniences of 
transportation without discrimination in 
the charge therefor? 
And Section I of Article 15 of the Constitution reads as follows: 
" Senators and all Representatives, and 
all judicial, State and County Officers, 
shall, before entering upon the duties of 
their respective offices, take and subscribe 
to the following oath or affirmation-etc? 
I n
 Dayton V. Swapp, D. C. Utah *±8k F. Supp. 958 above which 
noted: 
"Implicit in concept of due process are 
ideas that government must follow it's 
own rules and that it must do so within 
reasonable time? 
The compulsory nondiscretionary nature of the souereign's 
duty to follow it's own rules is highlighted by a continuation 
of the same C. J. S. citation at page 266. 
"and where a state has established proceedure 
which comports with due process, state and 
local officials are bound to follow those 
procedures. 
(citing Wolf V. Lillie V. Kenosha County Sheriff, D. C. Wis., 5#f 
The local Cache County prosecutorial and judicial "Discresionary 
compliance is dispelled with the case of Deseret Savings Bank 
V. Francis, 62 Utah 85, 217 P. II3A (1923). Qjioting from 
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Supervisors V, UJ3.4 wall ^ 35, 18 L. ED. *H9: 
"The conclusion to be deduced from the 
authorities is that, where power is given 
to public officers, in the language of 
the act before us, or in equivalent language, 
whenever the public interest or individual 
rights call for it's exercise, the language, 
though permissive in form, is in fact pre-
eraatory. What they are empowered to do for 
a third person, the law requires shall be 
done. The power is given, not for their 
benefit, but for his. It is placed with the 
depository to meet the demands of right, 
and to prevent a failure of Justice. It is 
given as a remedy to those entitled to invoke 
it's aid, and who would be otherwise re-
mediless . 
"In all such cases it is held that the in-
tent, which is the test, was not to devolve 
a mere discretion, but to impose a positive 
and absolute duty? 
The following quotation from G. J. S. establishes clearly that 
compliance is required by due process: 
"In criminal matters, due process requirements 
must be rightfully adhered to. Whether de-
fendant's constitutional right to due process 
of law has been infringed in a criminal pro-
secution will be determined on the particular 
facts of each case, but any substajitual doubt 
as to a possible deprivation of due process of 
law must be resolved in favor of the defendant? 
16 G C. J. S. Con. Law Sec. 99 Z K&. 350 &35I 
" The more serious the deprivation (arrest, 
imprisonment ) the more extensive the procedural 
safeguards which must precede it's imposition, 
so the extent to which procedural due process 
must be afforded a person is influenced by the 
extent to which a person may be condemned to 
suffer a grievous loss? 
(16 C-C. J. S. Con law Sec. 967 PG 2^8) 
"The due process clauses require that a power 
conferred by law be exercised judiciously with 
an honest intent to fulfill the purpose of law, 
and it is a judicial function to see that the 
requirement is met? 
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(16 C C.T.S. Low Law Sec. 967 PO Zfy) 
James Jenkins who prosecuted Appellant Elwood as a Deputy County 
Attorney, at every stage was a De Facto imposter. He was not appointed 
in writing and did not file the required Oath of Office. The Court 
never acquired jurisdiction, the Court thus deprived Appellant of Due 
Process. 
This is a jurisdictional defect of the highest order, under 
Section 77-35-5 (b) U.C.A. 1953 and the following Utah Cases: State 
V. Freeman, (1937) 93 U.I25, 71 P. 2d 196 1 State V. Merritt (T925J 
67 Utah 355-
Utah Constitution, Article IV Sec 10 clearly requires the before 
entering upon their duties, Deputy County Attorneys as county officers 
must "file the prescribed Oath of Office.ALL ACTS of defacto officials 
taken before they file the oaths are unofficial misconduct, under Utah 
Code Sec 52- 2-1 U.C.A. 1953-
The statute also requires that he be appointed by L.F. Gunnell 
in writing, he never was. 
In Page V. McAfee, 487 -P. 2d 861 (UT 1971) these facts must 
be determinative: 
"Under our Statute, to become a Deputy, 
three facts were absolutely necessary: 
1. His appointment must have been made in 
writing, which was not done. 
2. Such written appointment must have 
been filed in the office of the County 
Clerk, which was not done. 
3. He was required to take the Oath which 
was not done. 
The same Statute, in the same para in clear language says: 
"Until such appointment is so made and 
filed and until such deputy shall have 
taken the Oath of Office, no one shall 
be or act as such deputy? 
Judge Ellett illuminates all fours appliciation of Page to 
case at bar by concluding; 
"Simply because an acting Deputy County 
Attorney had not taken the written Oath 
when he had prosecuted Criminal Cases 
under the direction of the duly qualified 
County Attorney for eight years, the trial 
is a nullity. 
Even if Arguendo, he was qualified in 1981, he had to requalify 
for Gunnell*s subsequent terms. See 63 A. Am Jur 2d. public officers 
and employees, Sec 129. 
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Appellant Elwood's claim is in accord with the Attorney General, 
State of Utah's opinion No. 32-115 dated February 23, 1984. (Slip 
opinion is in Appellants Exhibits attached to his petition,) 
In particular please note on the last page (015OK) subsection 
3 of para (5) which states: 
"Legal authority showing Appellant's 
conviction should be reversed if in 
fact said Attorneys had not taken the 
Oath1.1 
Utah Code Section I7-I6-8 U. C, A. 1953 reads: 
"Whenever the official name of any 
principal officer is used in any law 
conferming powers or imposing duties 
or liabilities it includes deputies? 
The law states in 43 Am. Jur, public officers, Section 469, to be: 
"Adeputy may be an officer de facto 
and not de jure, for failing to qualify, 
as by failing to take the qualifying 
Oath and Oath of office, without in-
validating his official acts as to third 
person1? 
DUE PROCESS OF LAW IS AI£0 PROVIDED APPELLANT UNDER THE UTAH 
CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE I. SECTION 7. 
POINT IV Ineffective Counsel 
In Bundy V, Deland, 94 Utah Adr. Rep 9 (Sup. Ct 10/26/88) 
the Court stated that: 
Habeas Corpus proceedings may be used 
to attack a judgement or conviction in 
the event of an obvious injustice or a 
substantual and prejudical denial of a 
Constitutional right in the trial of 
the matter; However, it cannot be used 
for regular appellate review. 
appeal was filed by Counsel this claim is proper, 
V, Gibbons, ?04 P. 2d 1309 (Utah I987)it 
"The trial court has the burden of ensuring 
that constitutional and rule requirements of 
due process are complied with when a guilty 
plea is entered. 
Since no 
In State 
states: 
II 
Appellant's attorney led him to believe that an incarceration 
of approximately 12 months would be the outcome of his plea, and 
in para (C.) it states: 
"Due process was violated where the 
taking of a guilty plea did not comport 
with the requirements of Rule II (e) 
in that the defendant was not informed 
of the elements of the crimes charged 
agaist him. 
Appellant has been incarcerated since May 22, 1987, the Board 
Pardons at his original hearing required a re-hearing in four years, 
the current policies of the Board of Pardon requires similarily 
situated offender to an incarceration time of approximately 6 years. 
Counsel's advise was incorrect and misleading. The reality of 
Appellants incarceration will be 5 times what he believed would be 
the outcome of his plea. 
I n
 Summers V. Cook, 87 Utah Adv. Rep. 26 (ct app.88) it states: 
"Habeas Corpus review appropriate where 
the petitioner has shown good cause why 
a direct appeal from the denial of his 
plea of guilt was not made. 
Appellant had no idea what the Board of Pardons would require 
until 8 months after his incarceration. At that time a direct appeal 
was untimely. 
12 
CONCLUSION 
The prosecutional process in this case in employing the full 
power of the State of Utah against Appellant Elwood evinces an array 
of breaches of the States own Constitutional and statutory rules. 
The breach by it's own officers is the clearest form of due process 
infringement. 
WHEREFORE it is the prayer of Appellant Elwood that his trial 
be declared null and void and that he be remanded to Cache County 
that he be given a legal and lawful outcome of any and all charges 
that he is required to defend himself against in the future. 
Dated this /# day of £ l e ^ 1989 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and exact copy of this document 
was mailed to the following Defendants on this t& day of 
December, 1989. 
I. Attorney General, State of Utah 
236 Utah State Capitol Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84-11^  
Plaintiff/Appellant 
V CONSTITUTION OK THE UNITED STATES ART. VII 
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme 
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, 
any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary not-
withstanding. 
The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the Mem-
bers of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial 
Officers, both of the United States and of the several States, shall be 
bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution; but no 
religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or 
public Trust under the United States. 
ARTICLE VII 
The Ratification of the Conventions of nine States, shall be sufficient 
for the Establishment of this Constitution between the States ratifying 
the Same. Done in convention by the unanimous consent of the states 
present the seventeenth day of September in the year of our Lord one 
thousand seven hundred and eighty seven and of the independence of 
the United States of America the twelfth. In Witness Whereof we have 
hereunto subscribed our names, 
Attest: 
WILLIAM JACKSON, Secretary 
New Hampshire 
Massachusetts 
Connecticut 
New York 
New Jersey 
Pennsylvania 
Go. WASHINGTON—Presidt. 
and deputy from Virginia 
{ JOHN LANGDON, NICHOLAS GILMAN. 
f NATHANIEL GORHAM, 
\ RUFUS KINO. 
J WM. SAML. JOHNSON, 
\ ROGER SlIKRMAN. 
ALEXANDER HAMILTON. 
W l L : lilVINGSTON, 
DAVID BREARLEY, 
WM. PATTERSON, 
JONA: DAYTON. 
f B FRANKLIN, 
THOMAS MIFFLIN, 
ROUT MORRIS, 
GEO. CLYMER, 
TIIOS. FITZSIMONS, 
JARED INGERSOLL, 
JAMES WILSON, 
GOUV MORRIS. 
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0FT1CIAL OATHS AND BONDS 52-1-4 
52-1-2. Bonds to state — Approval and recording — Filing 
of oaths. 
Whenever state officers, officials of state institutions, or other persons, are 
required to give official bonds to the state, the bonds, unless otherwise pro-
vided, shall be approved by the Division of Finance, and recorded by the state 
treasurer in a book kept for that purpose. The oaths of office of all state 
officials shall be filed with the Division of Archives. 
CHAPTER 2 
FAILURE TO QUALIFY FOR OFFICE 
'Section 
62-2-1. Tim* in which to qualify — Failure 
— Office declared vacant 
52-2-1. Time in which to qualify — Failure — Office de-
clared vacant 
Whenever any person duly elected or appointed to any office of the state or 
any of its political subdivisions, fails to qualify for such office within sixty 
days after the date of beginning of the term of office for which he was elected 
or appointed, such office shall thereupon become vacant and shall be filled as 
provided by law. Whenever the bond of any officer of the state or of any of its 
political subdivisions is canceled, revoked, annulled or otherwise becomes 
void or of no effect, without another proper bond being given so that contin-
uance of bonded protection is afforded, the office of such officer shall there-
217 
ABUSE OF OFFICE 
Section 
76-8-201. Official misconduct — Unauthorized 
acts or failure of duty. 
76-8-202. Official misconduct — Unlawful acts 
based on "inside** information. 
76-8*203. Unofficial misconduct. 
76-8-201. Official misconduct — Unauthorized 
acta or failure of doty. 
A public servant is guilty of a class B misdemeanor 
if. with an intent to benefit himself or another or to 
harm another, he knowingly eommits an unautho* 
rized act which purports to be an act of his office, or 
knowingly refrains from performing a duty imposed 
on him by law or clearly inherent in the nature of his 
office.
 i m 
76-8-203. Unofficial misconduct 
(1) A person is guilty of unofficial misconduct if he 
exercises or attempts to exercise any of the functions 
of a public office when: 
(a) He has not taken and filed the required 
oath of office; or 
(b) He has failed to execute and file the re-
quired bond; or 
(c) He has not been elected or appointed to of-
fice; or 
(d) He exercises any of the functions of his of-
fice after his term has expired and the successor 
has been elected or appointed and has qualified, 
or after (iia office has been legally removed. 
(e) He knowingly withholds or retains from his 
successor in office or other person entitled to the 
official seal or any records, papers, documents, or 
other writings appertaining or belonging to his 
office or mutilates or destroys or takes away the 
same. 
(2) Unofficial misconduct is a class B misde-
CONSTITUTION OP UTAH ART. V, § 1 
hold over; he may resign. Tooele County v. 
Pe La Mare, 90 U. 46, 59 P. 2d 1155, 106 
A. L. R. 182, superseding !>0 U. 23, 3D 1\ 
2d 1051, and following State ex rcl. Stain 
v. Christensen, 84 U. 185, 35 P. 2d 775. 
Indefinite term of office. 
General rule that term for which officer 
is elected shall ho fixed hefore election is 
inapplicable where voters, at Maine elec-
tion, vote on officer and also on proposed 
constitutional amendment extending term 
of that office. Snow v. Keddington, 113 U. 
325, 195 P. 2d 234. 
Collateral References. 
Beginning or expiration of term of clec« 
tivo office where no time fixed by law, 80 
A. L. B. 1290, 135 A. I* Ii. 1173. 
Power of board to make appointment to 
office or contract extending beyond its 
owu term, 149 A. L. It. 336. 
"Until" as word of inclusion or exclu-
sion where term of office runs until a 
specified day, 1C A. L. It. 1100. 
Sec. 10. [Oath of office.] 
All officers made elective or appointive by this Constitution or by the 
laws made in pursuance thereof, before entering upon the duties of 
their respective offices, shall take and subscribe the following oath or 
affirmation: "I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support, obey 
and defend the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution 
of this State, and that I will discharge the duties of rny office with 
fidelity, n 
Compiler's Notes. 
The quotation marks at the end of this 
section have been carried in brackets in 
all compilations sinco ltevised Statutes of 
1898. 
Comparable Prevision. 
Montana Const., Art. XiX, § 1. 
Cross-Reference. 
Oaths of officers, 52-1-1. 
Bond required in addition to oath. 
Statute requiring state treasurer to give 
bond is not unconstitutional on ground 
that legislature eould not add to require-
ment in this section. State ex reU Stain 
v. Christensen, 84 U. 185, 35 P. 2d 775. 
Formal ritual unnecessary. 
A deputy county recorder took the oath 
of office, required by this section, by his 
signing of oath form duly notarised by a 
deputy county clerk (a person duly au-
thorized to administer oaths) although he 
did not go through some formal ritual, 
with the raising of his right hand. State 
v. Mathews, 13 U. (2d) 391, 375 P. 2d 392. 
Supremo Court Justices required to take 
oath. 
Judges of the Supremo Court subscribe 
to this oath when entering upon their 
duties as justices thereof. Critchlow v. 
Monson, 102 U. 378, 131 P. 2d 794. For 
sequel to this case, see State ex rel. Jugler 
v. Grover, 102 U. 459, 132 P. 2d 125. 
Collateral References. 
Omcers®=>36(l). 
67 C.J.S. Officers § 38. 
Member of grand or petit jury as officer 
within constitutional or statutory provi-
sions in relation to oath or affirmation, 
118 A. L. R. 1098. 
ARTICLE V 
DISTRIBUTION OF POWERS 
Section. 
1. [Three departments of government.] 
Section 1. [Three departments of government.] 
The powers of the government of the State of Utah shall be divided 
into three distinct departments, the Legislative, the Executive, and the 
Judicial; and no person charged with the exercise of powers properly 
belonging to one of these departments, shall exercise any functions 
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sickness or the weather.52 The authorities generally hold that in case of a 
contest, it is not necessary to qualify until the question of title is determined.53 
If a statute fixes the time within which an elected officer must qualify, the 
officer may, in anticipation of his induction into the office, take and execute 
his official oath and bond, and deposit them with the proper authority prior to 
that time; but such acts do not operate or become effective as a qualification 
until after the time when the law provides that he must qualify.54 
^C§ 129. Official bond. 
Most public officers are required to give a bond for the performance of their 
official duties,55 even when re-elected or reappointed to succeed themselves.58 
A periodical renewal of the bond is sometimes required of particular officers,57 
and where the circumstances warrant it, a new bond may be called for.58 
As a rule, an officer does not acquire a legal standing until the required 
bond is given,59 although he may be regarded as an officer de facto.60 It may 
even be made a misdemeanor for an officer to act in his official capacity 
without having first executed and filed the requisite bond.61 If a bond is 
required to be filed, a tender may be a sufficient compliance with the statutory 
requirement, especially where those authorized to approve the bond decline to 
act on the ground that the officer is not qualified to hold the office.62 
The time within which the officer must give the required bond63 and the 
manner of taking it64 are usually prescribed. The statute may expressly or by 
implication make the filing of the required bond within the time allowed for 
such purpose mandatory,65 and compliance with it a condition precedent to the 
right to take the ofiice, so that the right is lost by a failure to perform the 
condition within the time limited.66 It may be said, however, that official bonds 
arc intended for the benefit of the public,67 and that requirements of the law 
as to the time of filing them should not be taken as mandatory unless clearly 
52. Brown v Tama Countv, 122 Iowa 745, 98 
XW 562. 
53. Kreitz v Behrensmever, 149 111 496, 36 NE 
9S3; Murdoch v Strange', 99 Md 89, 57 A 62S; 
State ex rel. Barham v Graham, 161 Tenn 557, 
30 SW'2d 274; Rasmussen v Board of Com'rs, 8 
Wyo 277, 56 P 1098. 
54. Ballantvne v Bower, 17 Wyo 356, 99 P 
S69. 
55. Soule v United States. 100 US 8, 25 L Ed 
536; Broome v United States, 56 US 143, 14 L 
Ed 636; Farrar v United States, 30 US 373, 8 L 
Ed 159; United States v Kirkpatrick, 22 US 
720, 6 L Ed 199; American Surety Co. v Inde-
pendent School Dist. No. 18 (CA8 Minn) 53 
E2d 178. SI ALR I, cert den 284 US 683, 76 L 
Ed 577, 52 S Ct 200; Deatsch v Fairfield, 27 
Ariz 387. 233 P 887, 38 ALR 651; Kansas 
Amusement Co. v Eddv, 143 Kan 988, 57 P2d 
458, 105 ALR 702; Countv Com'rs of Calvert 
Countv v Monnett, 164 Md 101, 164 A 155, 86 
ALR 125S; Lawrence v American Suretv Co., 
263 Mich 586, 249 NW 3, 88 ALR 535; reh 
den 264 Mich 516, 250 NW 295, 88 ALR 546. 
For a discussion o( the form and sufficiency 
of official bonds and liability on such bonds, 
see §§ 487 et seq. 
56. § 130. 
57. Bullock v State, 65 NJL 557, 47 A 62. 
58. Broome v United States, 56 US 143, 14 L 
Ed 636. 
59. Broome v United States, 56 US 143, 14 L 
Ed 636. 
60. § 594. 
61 . Brown v Tama Countv, 122 Iowa 745, 98 
NW 562. 
62. Schmulbach v Speidel, 50 W Va 553, 40 
SE424 . 
63. Broome v United States. 56 US 143, 14 L 
Ed 636; Countv Com'rs of Calvert Countv v 
Monnett. 164 Md 101. 164 A 155, 86 ALR 
1258. 
64. Broome v United States. 56 US 143, 14 L 
Ed 636. 
65. Stale ex rel. Beige v Lansing, 46 Neb 514, 
64 NW 1104. 
66. State ex rel. Berge v Lansing, 46 Neb 514, 
64 NW 1104. 
67. Clavev v United States, 182 US 595, 45 L 
Ed 1247, 21 S Ct 891; United States v Bradlev. 
35 US 343, 9 L Ed 448. 
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so. In numerous cases they have been construed as merely directory.68 Thus, a 
statute providing that an office will become vacant on failure to furnish a bond 
within a specified time has been held to be only directory.69 Where the 
provision is only directory, noncompliance with it does not result in a 
forfeiture of the right to the office,70 but it will justify the authorities in 
refusing to accept and approve the bond.71 
Sickness or other matters that excuse delay on the part of an officer in 
taking steps to qualify for the office72 will justify delay in filing his bond.73 
§ 130. Requalifying on re-election, reappointment, or holding over. 
A public officer who at the end of his term of office is again chosen for the 
office must generally qualify for his new term by furnishing the required bond, 
taking an oath of office, "or performing whatever other acts may be necessary 
to qualify him for the position,74 and his failure to do so is accompanied by the 
same consequences as in the case of an original election or appointment.75 
Certain officers may be required by statute to renew their official bond at 
stated periods during their term of office.76 An officer holding over until his 
successor is chosen does so by virtue of his previous appointment, election, 
and qualification, and unless some provision of the law so requires, he need 
not requalify.77 
§ 131. Oath or affirmation. 
Before beginning his official duties, a public officer may be required by 
constitutional or statutory provisions to take an oath78 or make affirmation.79 
But the taking of an official oath does not per se make the position an office.80 
The prescribed oath of office may be exacted of every public officer, 
whether federal,81 state,82 county,83 or municipal.84 It is customary to require 
68. United States v Eaton, 169 US 331, 42 L 
Ed 767, IS S Ct 374; United States v Bradlev, 
35 US 343, 9 L Ed 44S. 
69. § 142. 
70. Commissioners of Knox Countv v John-
son, 124 Ind 145. 24 NE 148; State ex rel. 
Dithmar v Bunnell, 131 Wis 198, 110 N\V 177. 
71. §501. 
72. § 12S. 
73. Kreitz v Behrensmeser, 149 111 496. 36 NE 
9S3; Murdoch \ Strange,'99 Md 89, 57 A 62S. 
74. Walker \ Hughes (Sup) 42 Del 447, 36 
A2d 47, 151 ALR 946; Roue v Tuck. 149 Ga 
83. 99 SE 303, 5 ALR 113. 
75. Bullock \ State, 65 NJL 557, 47 A 62. 
76. § 129. 
77. Baker Citv v Murph\. 30 Or 405. 42 P 
133. 
78. L\ons \ Woods, 153 VS 649. 3$ 7 7 E d 
854. 14 S Ct 959; Parker v Overman. 59 US 
137, 15 L Ed 318; American Suretv Co. v 
Independent School Dist. No. 18 (CAS Minn) 
53 F2d ITS. 81 ALR 1. cert den 284 US 683, 
76 L Ed'577. 52 S Ct 200; Adams v State, 214 
Ind COa* 17 NE2d 84. 118 ALR 1095; June v 
School Dist.. 283 Mich 533, 278 N\V 676. 116 
ALR 581; State ex re!. Mitchell v McDonald. 
164 Miss 405, H 5 So 505. 86 ALR 290; State 
ex rel. Barney vHaukins , 79 Mont 506. 257 P 
411, 53 ALR 583; McCue \ AntiselL 105 NJ 
^Super 128, ^ 31 A2d SQS. 
Practice Aids.—Form drafting guide—official 
oath. 15 AM JUR LEGAL FORMS 2d, PUBLIC 
OFFICERS § 213:61. 
Oath of office. 15 AM JUR LEGAL FORMS 2d, 
PUBLIC OFFICERS §213:62. 
Oath or affirmation of public emplovee. 15 
AM JUR LEGAL FORMS 2d, PUBLIC EMPLOYEES 
§210:26. 
79. People ex rel. German Ins. Co. v Williams, 
145 111573,33 NE 849. 
Practice Aids.—Affirmation of office. 15 AM 
JUR LEGAL FORMS 2d, PUBLIC OFFICERS 
§213:64. 
80. § 4. 
SI. I'S Const. Art VI. cl 3. 
As to the oath required of and administered 
to federal officers and emplo\ees, see 5 USCS 
§§2903-2906. 3331. 
82. Bond v Flovd. 385 US 116, 17 L Ed 2d 
235,87 S C t 339. 
83. Oklahoma Cit\ \ Oklahoma R. Co., 20 
Okla 1,93 P 4 8 . 
84. Frans v Young. 30 Neb 360, 46 N'W 528. 
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76-8-109 CRIMINAL CODE 
76-8-109. Failure of member of legislature to disclose interest in meas-
ure or bill.—Every member of the legislature who has a personal or private 
interest in any measure or bill proposed or pending before the legislature of 
which he is a member and does not disclose the fact to the house of which 
he is a member and votes thereon is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
History: C. 1953, 76-8-109, enacted by 
L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-8-109. 
Part 2 
Abuse of Office 
76-8-201. Official misconduct—Unauthorized acts or failure of duty.— 
A public servant is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if, with an intent to 
benefit himself or another or to harm another, he knowingly commits an 
unauthorized act which purports to be an act of his office, or knowingly 
refrains from performing a duty imposed on him by law or clearly inherent 
in the nature of his office. 
History: C. 1953, 76-8-201, enacted by Collateral References. 
L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-8-201. Officers€=121. 
Cross-Keferences. ^ C.J.S. Officers § 133. 
Penalty for receiving illegal fees, 21-7- C3 A m - J u r - 2<* 837> Public Officers and 
13 to 21-7-15. Employees § 346. 
76-8-202. Official misconduct—Unlawful acts based on "inside" infor-
mation.—A public servant is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if, knowing 
that official action is contemplated or in reliance on information which he 
has acquired by virtue of his office or from another public servant, which 
information'has not been made public, he: 
(1) Acquires or divests himself of a pecuniary interest in any prop-
erty, transaction, or enterprise which may be affected by such action or in-
formation ; or 
(2) Speculates or wagers on the basis of such action or information; or 
(3) Knowingly aids another to do any of the foregoing. 
History: C. 1953, 76-8-202, enacted by Collateral References. 
L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-8-202. OfficersC=121. 
07 C.J.S. Officers § 133. 
03 Am. Jur. 2d S37, Public Officers and 
Employees § 346. 
76-8-203. Unofficial misconduct.—(1) A person is guilty of unofficial 
misconduct if he exercises or attempts to exercise any of the functions of a 
public office when: 
(a) He has not taken and filed the required oath of office; or 
(b) He has failed to execute and file the required bond; or 
(c) He has not been elected or appointed to office; or 
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OFFENSES AGAINST GOVERNMENT 76-8-301 
(d) He exercises any of the functions of his office after his term has 
expired and the successor has been elected or appointed and has qualified, 
or after his office has been legally removed. 
(e) He knowingly withholds or retains from his successor in office or 
other person entitled to the official seal or any records, papers, documents, 
or other writings appertaining or belonging to his office or mutilates or 
destroys or takes away the same, 
(2) Unofficial misconduct is a class B misdemeanor. 
History: C. 1953, 76-8-203, enacted by Constitutionality of statute requiring, or 
L. 1373, ch. 196, § 76-8-203. limiting, selection or appointment of pub-
lic officers or agents from members of a 
Collateral References. political party or parties, 170 A. L. R. 198. 
OffkersG=>121. Time as of which eligibility or ineligi-
67 C.J.S. Officers § 133. bility to office is to be determined, 143 
63 Am. Jur. 2d 837, Public Officers and A. L. R. 1026. 
Employees § 346. 
DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW 
Mandamus of de facto officers. ute to compel them to perform duties they 
Mandamus could issue against de facto ha<i already voluntarily assumed to do. 
drainage district officers who had not Colorado Development Co. v. Creer, 96 U. 
made oath and filed bond required by stat- h ^ P» 2d 914. 
Part 3 
Obstructing Governmental Operations 
76-8-301. Interference with public servant.—A person is guilty of a 
class B misdemeanor if he uses force, violence, intimidation, or engages in 
any other unlawful act with a purpose to interfere with a public servant 
performing or purporting to perform an official function. 
History: C. 1953, 76-8-301, enacted by 5S Am. Jur. 2d S62, Obstructing Justice 
L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-8-301. § 10. 
Collateral References. Criminal liability for obstructing proc-
Obstructing Justice€=2. ess as affected by invalidity or irregular-
67 C.J.S. Obstructing Justice § 1. ity of the process, 10 A. L . ' R . 3d 1146. 
DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW 
Elements of offense. ficer in discharge of duty. State in Inter-
To make out offense it must have ap- e s t o f Hurley, 2S U. (2d) 248, 501 P. 2d 
peared that (a) duly constituted public m * 
officer, (b) engaged in performance of of- Employer who refused to bring employ-
fieial duty, (c) had been obstructed or re- ee out of factory so that deputy sheriff 
sisted by defendant. State v. Sandman, 4 could serve her with small claims court 
U. (2d) 69, 2S6 P. 2d 1060. order was not obstructing officer in per-
University security officer who arrested forming his duty where employer had no 
student in area where sole interests of uni- objections to service during various work 
versity were location of fraternity and breaks, including coffee, but not during 
religious institute for students was not working hours, since particular manufac-
discharging, or attempting to discharge, hiring process became dangerous if work 
any dutv of his office, and subsequent in- were impeded. State v. Ludlow, 2S U. (2d) 
terference with arrest by fellow student 434, 503 P. 2d 1210. 
was not resistance or obstruction of of-
to 
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the purpose of an appeal from the judgment 
thereon."' While this is t rue, it does not 
follow tha t one who is neither a necessary 
nor a proper par ty to the action must be 
considered adverse merely because he ap-
pears as such upon the record. Having part-
ed with his ti t le to the fund by his assign-
ment to the plaintiff, as he admits, Franko-
vich was not a necessary or proper party, be-
cause he had no interest in the action. His 
presence as a par ty , therefore, was no more 
appropriate than tha t of any other stranger. 
No relief was demanded against him, nor did 
he demand any. Nor could he have any in-
terest in the result of the appeal. The jus-
tice might have dismissed the action as to 
him of his own motion. This would not have 
affected him in the least. Under such cir-
cumstances, he was not an adverse party, 
and it was not incumbent upon plaintiff to 
t r ea t him as such. The motion to dismiss 
the appeal was properly denied. 
I t is said t ha t the court should have sus-
tained Par i s Bros. ' demurrer . In this con-
tention there is no merit . The justice sus-
tained the demurrer , and practically dis-
missed these defendants out of the' case. 
This was upon the theory, presumably, tha t 
he would not enter ta in the action as brought 
and grant the relief demanded against them. 
I t had accomplished i ts purpose. When the 
order of substi tution was made, the objection 
was not urged tha t the complaint did not 
tender an issue upon the question of right 
between them and the plaintiff. The district 
court should have disregarded it, as it virtu-
ally did by overruling it. 
The court overruled an objection to evi-
dence of a conversation had between plaintiff 
and Frankovich a t the t ime the assignment 
was made. The conversation related to the 
consideration for the ass ignment ; such con-
sideration being medical services rendered 
to Frankovich by the plaintiff, who is a phy-
sician. No question was made as to the suffi-
ciency of the consideration to support the 
assignment, nor as to whether it was for 
value. The evidence was therefore no t com-
petent. But it is apparent t ha t the ruling 
was not prejudicial. The appellants offered 
no evidence, but rested their case entirely 
upon their objection to the jurisdiction. Up-
on the evidence furnished by the writing 
alone, the court was justified in directing a 
verdict for plaintiff, as it did. The admis-
sion of. the incompetent evidence could not 
have affected the judgment of the court in 
this mat ter . 
The verdict re turned under the direction 
of the court is as follows: "We, the jury in 
the above-entitled action, find as our ver-
dict t ha t the plaintiff A. E. Anderson is en-
titled to the sum of $94 heretofore paid into 
court." I t is said tha t there is no evidence 
tha t any sum had been paid into court, and 
hence no evidence to support this verdict. 
It is apparent , however, t ha t the part ies and 
the judge proceeded upon the assumption 
that the company had paid to the justice the 
amount in controversy at the time it was dis-
missed from the case and was in the hands 
of the clerk at the time of the tr ial . The 
fact tha t it had been paid to the justice is 
recited in the answer of Paris Bros. In any 
event, we must assume that the fact that it 
had been paid to the clerk was known to the 
court, or, if not actually known, was ascer-
tained before it adjudged tha t the sum be-
longed to the plaintiff. There is no merit in 
this contention. 
The judgment entered declares the plain-
tiff entitled to recover of Par is Bros, the 
sum of $94 in the hands of the clerk, with 
interest and costs. I t is not correct in 
awarding any recovery as against the appel-
lants, except for costs. I t would be manifest-
ly wrong that appellants should be compelled 
to pay interest for the time during which the 
sum in controversy was in the hands of the 
clerk. The judgment should simply have 
awarded the sum in dispute to the plaintiff, 
and adjudged appellants to pay the costs. 
The cause is remanded, with directions to 
the district court to modify the judgment as 
herein indicated. When so modified it will 
stand affirmed; the respondent to recover 
his costs. 
Modified and affirmed. 
HOLLOWAY and SMITH, JJ . , concur. 
(20 Okl. 1) 
OKLAHOMA CITY v. OKLAHOMA RY. CO. 
(Supreme Court of Oklahoma. Dae. 18, 1907.) 
1. MANDAMUS — PERFORMANCE OF P U B L I C 
SERVICE. 
"When there is a grant and acceptance of 
a public franchise which involves the perform-
ance of a certain service, the person or corpora-
tion accepting such franchise can by mandamus 
be compelled to perform such service." 
[Ed. Note.—For cases in point, see Cent. Dig, 
vol. 33, Mandamus, § 2GS.] 
2. CARRIERS — CONTROL AND R E G U L A T I O N -
PREFERENCES AND DISCRIMINATIONS—PASS-
ES— H A L F - F A R E TICKETS. 
The provisions of section 13, art. 9, of the 
Constitution, do not prohibit a municipal cor-
poration operating a street railway from fur-
nishing transportation free to its policemen and 
firemen and United States mail carriers, and 
half-rate tickets to school children, and fre€ 
transportation to children under a certain ag€ 
whilst traveling with a parent or guardian. 
3. SAME. 
Municipalities are not prohibited by the pro-
visions of section 13, art. 9, of the Constitution, 
from granting franchises for street railways with 
conditions coutained therein for the carrying of 
policemen, firemen, United States mail carriers, 
and children under a certain age free, and for 
the furnishing of transportation to school chil-
dren at a reduced fare, and when accepted by 
the grantee in the franchise, are valid. 
4. OFFICERS—QUALIFICATION—OATH. 
Policemen, firemen, and United States mail 
carriers are not officers contemplated or includ-
ed by section 1, art. 15, of the Constitution. 
5. CARRIERS — CONTROL AND REGULATION — 
PREFERENCES AND REGULATIONS — HALF-
FARE TICKETS. 
Street railways undertaking and" contract-
ing with municipalities by provisions contained 
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in franchises granted by such municipalities, to 
carry policemen, firemen, United States mail 
carriers, and children under a certain age free, 
<ind also to carry school children at half the 
regular rate, are not absolved therefrom by sec-
tion 13, art. 9, of the Constitution. 
(Syllabus by the Court.) 
Application by the city of Oklahoma City 
for writ of mandamus to the Oklahoma Rail-
way Company. Writ granted. 
The relator is a municipal corporation and 
a city of the first class under the laws of the 
state of Oklahoma, and has been since the 
1st day of January, A. D. 1902. On the 30th' 
clay of January, 1902, the mayor and council 
of said city duly passed an ordinance author-
izing the Metropolitan Street Railway Com-
pany, among other things, to build and con-
struct a system of electric street railways 
over and along the streets of said city, defin-
ing the conditions of the exercise of the au-
thority therein conferred to construct such 
street railway system, and regulating the op-
eration and maintenance thereof, and impos-
ing certain contractual obligations on said 
company. Thereafter, on the 8th day of Feb-
ruary, 1902, the Metropolitan Street Railway 
company, in accordance with the require-
ments of said ordinance, filed with the city 
clerk of said city its proper and written ac-
ceptance of the terms and conditions thereof. 
Thereafter during said year, the Metropoli-
tan Street Railway Company constructed a 
system of railways in said city, and placed 
the same in operation, and on the 15th day 
of June, 1904, said railway company sold, 
conveyed, and assigned its said railway sys-
tem, together with the franchise rights and 
privileges existing in its favor by virtue of 
said ordinance, to the Oklahoma Railway 
Company, the respondent herein, and said re-
spondent, in order to procure the assent of 
the mayor and councilmen of said city to 
said transfer, filed the said transfer with the 
mayor and councilmen of said city, together 
with its written acceptance and assumption 
of all the duties and burdens imposed there-
in. Thereafter, on the 27th day of June, 
1004, an ordinance was duly passed ratify-
ing and confirming said transfer to said re-
spondent, and authorized the extension and 
maintenance of said system, of street rail-
ways on the streets and public thoroughfares 
of said city, said respondent thereby becom-
ing subrogated to all the powers and rights 
in said original ordinance of the Metropoli-
tan Railway Company, and thereby became 
Round to the performance of all the duties 
therein imposed upon said railway company, 
•^s a part of the consideration for the grant-
Ina of said privileges by virtue of said ordi-
nance and for the use of the streets and pub-
nc thoroughfares in said city by said rail-
way company in the transportation of pas-
Sengers from one point to another, it was 
Provided in section 7 of said ordinance as fol-
o\vs: "The charges for transporting passen-
?ers to be exacted by said railway company 
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shall not exceed the sum of five cents for one 
continuous passage over the said company's 
lines from points within the city limits to 
any other point in such city; such limit in 
price shall not prevent the exaction of any 
additional fare for return journeys, nor shall 
transfer slips be good for stop-over privileges. 
Tickets for the use of school children shall 
be furnished good for one continuous pas-
sage, in quantities not less than twenty rides 
at the rate of two and one half cents each, 
under any reasonable regulation which the 
company may impose to prevent the abuse of 
such privilege or the use of such tickets by 
others than children under fifteen years of 
age in actual attendance on the public schools 
of said city. United States mail carriers, po-
licement, and members of the fire depart-
ment, while in the discharge of their duties 
shall be carried free." Said respondent has 
refused, and does refuse, to issue and furnish 
tickets for the use of school children for one 
continuous passage in quantities of not less 
than 20 rides at the rate of 2% cents each, 
and has further refused to carry United 
States mail carriers, policemen, and members 
of the fire department when in the discharge 
of their duties, and children under five years 
of age when accompanied by parents or 
guardians, free; but is collecting of and 
from all children, mail carriers, policemen, 
and members of the fire department, and 
such children under the age of five years the 
full authorized fare under the terms of said 
franchise, five cents for each passenger car-
ried, in violation of the terms of said fran-
chise agreement. It is further alleged by 
the plaintiff that the transportation of its po-
licemen and firemen while in the discharge 
of their official duties by the said railway 
company is a valuable undertaking in behalf 
of said city, and that, if the said provision 
is not enforced against said railway com-
pany, it will work great hardship in requir-
ing it to pay a large amount of money for 
the passage of its policemen and firemen over 
said railway while in the discharge of their 
several duties, to the great damage and in-
jury of said city. Relator further alleges 
and avers that said city has paid, and is pay-
ing, said respondent to transport said persons 
and for said reduced fares as a part of the 
rental or consideration of the use of the 
streets for said street railway system, and 
it was so understood and agreed that said 
railway company should render said service 
as a part of the consideration for the use of 
said streets and the privileges granted under 
said franchise, and that during the five years 
the said street railway company had been 
operating in said city numerous schoolhouses 
have been erected with reference to the line 
and routes of said respondent's railway sys-
tem to promote the convenience of children of 
school age attending schools of said city, and 
that inhabitants thereof have built and lo-
cated their homes and residences with refer-
ence to such routes, and with reference to 
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the cheap and convenient line for their chil-
dren to reach the schools of said city to 
which they might be assigned, and that the 
discontinuance of the sale of said school 
tickets will work a great hardship to the 
said relator and its inhabitants. The re-
spondent voluntarily entered its appearance, 
without the issuance of an alternative writ, 
and confessed the facts stated in said peti-
tion, but alleged as a matter of law that the 
relief demanded should be denied under the 
provisions of section 13, art. 9, of the Con-
stitution of the state of Oklahoma, and sub-
mitted this case under such issue of law. 
T. G. Chambers and John Embry, U. S. 
Atty., for relator. John W. Shartel, for re-
spondent. 
WILLIAMS, C. J. (after stating the facts as 
above). "When there is a grant and accept-
ance of a public franchise which involves the 
performance of a certain service, the person 
or corporation accepting such franchise can 
by mandamus be compelled to perform such 
service." Merrill on Mandamus, § 21: Sec-
tion 13 of article 9 of the Constitution of the 
state of Oklahoma reads as follows: "No 
railroad or transportation company, or trans-
mission company shall, directly or indirectly, 
issue or give any free frank or free ticket, 
free pass* or other free transportation, for 
any use, within this state, except to its em-
ployees and their families, its officers, agents, 
surgeons, physicians, and attorneys at law; 
to ministers of religion, traveling secretaries 
for railroad Young Men's Christian Associa-
tions, inmates of hospitals and charitable and 
eleemosynary institutions and persons exclu-
sively engaged in charitable and eleemosy-
nary work; to indigent, destitute and home-
less persons, and to such persons when trans-
ported by charitable societies or hospitals, 
and the necessary agents, employed in such 
transportations; to inmates of the National 
Homes, or State Homes for disabled Volun-
teer Soldiers, and of Soldiers' and Sailors' 
Homes, including those about to enter and 
those returning home after discharge, and 
boards of managers of such Homes; to mem-
bers of volunteer fire departments and their 
equipage while traveling as such; to neces-
sary care takers of live stock, poultry, and 
fruit; to employees of sleeping cars, of ex-
press cars, and to linemen of telephone and 
telegraph companies ; to railway mail service 
employees, postoifice inspectors, custom in-
spectors, and immigration inspectors: to news-
boys on trains, baggage agents, witnesses at-
tending any legal investigation in which the 
railroad company or transportation company 
is interested, persons injured in wrecks, and 
phj-sicians and nurses attending such per-
sons : Provided, that this provision shall not 
be construed to prohibit the interchange of 
passes for the officers, agents and employees 
of common carriers and their families; nor 
to prohibit any common carrier from car-
rying passengers free with the object of pro, 
viding relief in cases of general epidemic, 
pestilence, or other calamitous visitation; 
nor to prevent them from transporting, free 
of charge, to their places of employment per-
sons entering their service, and the inter-
change of passes to that end; and any rail-
road, transportation, or transmission compa-
ny or any person, other than the persons ex-
cepted in this provision, who grants or uses 
any such free frank, free ticket, free pass, 
or free transportation within this state, shall 
be deemed guilty of a crime, and the Legis-
lature shall provide proper penalties for the 
violation of any provision of this section by 
the railroad or transportation or transmis-
sion company, or by any individual: Pro-
vided, that nothing herein shall prevent tbe 
Legislature from extending these provisions 
so as to exclude such free transportations or 
franks from other persons." The only ques-
tion that is necessary to be determined in 
this case is whether or not said section ab-
solves the respondent from its obligation and 
undertaking to the relator to furnish the 
tickets to the school children under the terms 
named, and to carry the policemen, firemen, 
mail carriers, and certain children free, as 
stipulated in said franchise. If it be deter-
mined that said section does not affect said 
obligations and undertakings in said fran-
chise, then the peremptory writ should issue. 
Section 6 of article 18 of said Constitution 
reads as follows: "Every municipal corpora-
tion within this state shall have the right 
to engage in any business or enterprise which 
majr be engaged in by a person, firm or cor-
poration by virtue of a franchise from said 
corporation." It could not be successfully 
contended that, if the relator were directly 
engaged in the business of operating said 
street railway line, it could not carry said, 
school children at the rates and under the 
terms designated in said franchise, or its 
policemen and firemen, the mail carriers, and 
children under five years of age when accom-
panied by a parent or guardian, without 
charge, on account of the provisions of sec-
tion 13, art. 9, supra; for the term "rail-
road" or "transportation company" or "trans-
mission company," as used in said section, 
would not include the relator. Section 1 of 
article 9 of the Constitution reads as follows: 
"As used in this article the term 'corporation' 
or 'company' shall include all associations 
and joint stock companies having any power 
or privileges, not possessed by individuals, 
and exclude all municipal corporations and 
public institutions owned or controlled by 
the state." Now, if the relator, being au-
thorized to operate a street railway system 
in said city, would be permitted under the 
provisions of this Constitution to furnish 
tickets to the school children under the terms 
and prices hereinbefore named, and to carry 
its policemen and firemen, the mail carriers, 
and certain children free, then, why would 
not a contract entered into to that end by the 
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relator be valid? The respondent herein is 
n0t furnishing "free transportation." Trans-
-portation and reduced rates to a certain cla«s 
j« in this case furnished not by the respond-
ent This is done by the city, the relator 
herein, which it has a right to do under the 
law. I11 K e Grimes v. Minneapolis, Lyndale 
& Minnetonka Railway Company, 37 Minn. 
07, 33 N. W. 34, the court said: "Grimes and 
wife conveyed to defendant certain land for 
the purposes of its railway, and in considera-
tion of the conveyance defendant agreed to 
*carry' said Grimes and wife, and any of 
their children, 'free of charge,' in the pas-
senger cars run upon its road. Plaintiff is 
one of the children mentioned. Held, that 
the effect of defendant's agreement is to en-
title the plaintiff to be carried free of charge. 
The fact that his father purchased and paid 
for this right of free carriage is not impor-
tant. The plaintiffs right is as complete as 
if he had purchased and paid for it himself, 
and, as a logical consequence, its' infringe-
ment, whether tortious or otherwise, is a 
wrong to him for which he has his action." 
In re Erie & Pittsburg Railway Company v. 
Douthet, SS Pa. 245. 32 Am. Rep. 45: "Thj 
agreement of the defendants was to give, 
plaintiff a pass over their railroad for 
self and his family for his lifetime as t] 
consideration of his release of the rightcof 
way over his land. The pass was given 
a while, and then refused, and this action 
was to recover damages for their breacry^f 
contract." The court held in the above e&se 
that the plaintiff was entitled to recover. 
Re Curry v. Kansas & Colorado Pacific Com-
pany, 5S Kan. 1S.-4S Pac. 5S3, the court sajj 
"The company cannot excuse itself uponnlie 
score of the interstate commerce act. Thj 
act forbids the gratuitous issuance of (mil-
way passes, not their issuance for a moneyed 
or other valuable consideration. The tj 
portation in question was paid for by a1 
veyance of land; and does, not, there! 
come within the prohibitive • terms of 
law behind which the company endeavors' 
shelter itself." In Re De'mpsey v. New York 
Central &. Hudson River Railway Company, 
146 N. Y. 294, 40 N. E. SGS, the court said: 
"In considering this question, it must be con-
ceded that, unless the contractual relations 
of the parties distinguished this case from 
that of the ordinary public officer, the issue 
of the annual pass would be illegal. This 
court has very recently held, in the case of 
a notary public, that while it was not quite 
obvious that he was not in that class of pub-
lic officers who should be prohibited from ac-
cepting privileges or favors from corpora-
tions, yet, as the language of the Constitution 
"^as plain and comprehensive the courts were 
bound to strictly enforce its provisions. Peo-
ple v. Rathbone, 145 X. Y. 434, 40 N. E. 305, 
2S
 L. R. A. 3S4. What, then, are the pre-
cise provisions of the Constitution which arc 
claimed to be violated by the strict perform-
ance of tills contract which was in force for 
nearly three years before the Constitution 
went into effect? 'No public officer or per-
son elected or appointed to a public office 
under the laws of this state shall directly or 
indirectly ask, demand, accept, receive, or 
consent to receive, for his own use or benefit 
* * * any free pass * * * from any 
corporation, or make use of the same for him-
self or in conjunction with another.' Const, 
art. 13, § 5. It will be observed that a pub-
lic officer is forbidden to receive and use a 
'free pass'; it being the obvious intention of 
the Constitution to prohibit the public officers 
of the state from receiving from corporations 
privileges or favors, in other words gifts, that 
might improperly influence them in the dis-
charge of their official duties. So, if this 
constitutional provision applies to the plain-
tiff as a public officer, it is due to the fact 
that he is accepting a 'free pass,' a gift from 
the defendant. This court more than 30 
years ago held that the holder of a pass who 
had compensated the corporation therefor 
could not be regarded in any just sense as a 
Co., 24 N. X. 227." It "was the obvious in-
dention of the Constitution, not only to pro-
hibit public officers of the state from receiv-
ing from corporations privileges or favors 
that might improperly influence them in the 
discharge of their official duties, but also 
that the general public should have equal 
facilities and conveniences of transportation' 
without discrimination in the charges there-
for. Section 1 of article 15 of the Constitu-
tion reads as follows: "Senators and repre-
sentatives, and all judicial, state and coun-
ty officers, shall, before • entering' upon the 
duties of their respective offices, take and 
subscribe to the following oath or affirma-
tion: 'I, , do solemnly swear (or affirm) 
that I will support, obey, and defend the Con-
stitution of the United States, and the Con-
stitution of the state of Oklahoma, and will 
discharge the duties of my office with fidelity ; 
that I have not paid, or contributed, either di-
rectly or indirectly, any money or other valu-
able thing, to procure mv nomination or elec-
tion (or appointment), except for necessary and 
proper expenses expressly authorized by law ; 
that I have not knowingly violated any elec-
tion law of the state, or procured it to be 
done by others in my behalf; that I will not,, 
knowingly, receive, directly or indirectly, any 
money or other valuable thing, for the per-
formance or non-performance of any act or 
duty pertaining to my office, other than the 
compensation allowed by law, and I further 
swear (or affirm) that I will not receive, use, 
or travel upon any free pass or on free trans-
portation during my term of office.' " Police-
men, firemen, and mail carriers are evidently 
not officers contemplated by said section. 
Policemen and firemen are not required un-
der the provisions of this Constitution to 
take this form of an oath; and hence it 
cannot be said that it was. or is now, against 
public policy for the relator, the municipality,. 
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to contract for the "free passage' ' of its po-
licemen and firemen and the mail carriers. 
Nor is it against public policy for said rela-
tor to contract for a special r a t e for school 
children whilst t raveling to and from school; 
for it is undoubtedly the policy of this state 
to support and maintain public schools. And 
so an undertaking for reduced fare to the 
end tha t the entire public may have the bene-
fit of i t for children whilst t raveling to and 
from school is not violative of the spiri t or 
the intention of section 13 of art icle 9 of the 
Constitution. Fur ther , it is good policy for 
the United States mail to be delivered free, 
being approved not only by the federal, but 
also by the local, government, and the relator 
acting wi th a view of promoting free delivery 
did not contract against public policy, nor 
does the Constitution either in letter or 
spirit prohibit such under taking which would 
neither reasonably tend to improperly in-
fluence such officers nor discriminate against 
the publ ic ; for the preservation of the peace, 
the attendance of children upon the public 
schools, and the free delivery of the United 
States mails are all conducive to the public 
welfare. The reduced t ranspor ta t ion for the 
children and the free t ransporta t ion for the 
policemen and firemen, the children of cer-
tain age, and mail carr iers does not come 
from the respondent rai lway company, but 
from the city. I t is the result of the city's 
act jus t as much so as if i t had by bonded 
undertaking raised the money and paid a 
moneyed consideration to the respondent cor-
poration, as a result of. which said corpora-
tion had undertaken and- bound itself to car-
ry the school children under the terms named 
in' tha t franchise, and to carry the policemen, 
firemen, mail carriers, and cer ta in children 
of a designated age free of charge; for the 
franchise was an undertaking grant ing priv-
ileges of great value. 
We are of the opinion t ha t th is contract 
which existed between Oklahoma City, the 
relator herein, and the Oklahoma Railway 
Company, the respondent herein, was not 
only a valid contract prior to the adoption of 
this Constitution, but is also now a valid con-
tract, and not in conflict wi th section 13 of 
article 9 of said Constitution, and tha t the 
former is entitled to the relief prayed for. 
Let the peremptory w r i t of mandamus issue. 
TURNER, KANE, DUNN, and HAYES, 
JJ . , concur. 
(33 Utah, 109) 
STATE v. BROWN. 
(Supreme Court of Utah. Dec. 17, 1907.) 
der the laws of a certain state is incompetent' 
this not being proof by reputation. ' 
[Ed. Note.—For cases in point, see Cent. Bi? 
vol. 12, Corporations, § 110.] 
2. FORGERY— UTTERING FORGED INSTRUMENTS-
INFORMATION—MATERIAL ALLEGATION. 
The allegation that the company was a cor-
poration, in an information charging that de-
fendant knowing the instrument to be forged, 
and with intent to damage a certain company, a 
corporation organized under certain laws, "ut-
tered and passed as true to a bank a writing 
purporting to be a check, is a material allega-
tion. 
[Ed. Note.—For cases in point, see Cent. D>. 
voi. 23, Forgery, § 86.] 
3. WORDS AND P H R A S E S — " R E P U T A T I O N . " 
' 'Reputation'' is what is generally said of 
a person by the people of the community where 
he is known. 
[Ed. Note.—For other definitions, see Words 
and Phrases, vol. 7, pp. 6118-6120.] 
Appeal from District Court, Salt Lake 
County; Geo. C. Armstrong, Judge. 
Arthur Brown appeals from a conviction. 
Reversed, and new trial granted. 
Powers & Marioneaux, for appellant. M. 
A. Breeden, Atty. Gen., and F. C. Loofbour-
ow, Dist. Atty., for the State. 
McCARTY, C. J. The defendant was 
tried and convicted for the crime of forgery. 
The information, so far as material here, 
alleges: "That the said Ar thur Brown, at 
the county of Salt Lake, in the s tate of 
Utah, on the 21st day of May, A. D 1906, 
did then and there willfully, unlawfully, 
feloniously, and knowing the same to be 
false, forged and counterfeited, and with in-
tent to prejudice, damage, and defraud the 
Utah Apex Mining Company, a corporation 
duly organized and existing under the laws 
of the state of Maine, utter, publish, and pass 
as true and genuine to and upon the Commer-
cial National Bank a certain false and coun-
terfeited writing or paper purporting to be a 
check, commonly called a 'bank check,' the 
tenor whereof is as follows [then follows the 
description of t h e check]." To prove the ex-' 
istence of the corporation mentioned in the 
information the district attorney, over the ob-
jections made by defendant, was permitted 
to ask W. C. Orein, a witness for-the state, 
and the witness was allowed to answer the 
following questions: "Q. Mr. Orern, what, if 
any, mining companies are you interested 
in? A. The Utah Apex Mining Company 
* * * and others. Q. I will ask you what 
sort of a company the Utah Apex Mining Com-
pany is? A. I t is a corporation organized 
under the laws of Maine. Q. I wjill ask you 
what, if any, business tha t corporation car-
ries on within this state? A. The business 
of mining." Other questions were asked by 
the district attorney, and answered by the 
witness, in which the corporate existence 
of the company was assumed, but no testi-
mony such as the s ta tute requires to prove 
corporate existence in cases of this kind was 
offered a t the trial. In fact, the only testi-
mony in the record tha t tends in any degree 
1. CORPORATIONS — PROOF OF CORPORATE E X -
ISTENCE. 
Under Rev. St. 189S, § 4859, providing that 
in a criminal case the existence of a corpora-
tion need not be shown by the articles or act 
of incorporation, but may be proved by'general 
reputation or by the statutes of the state by 
which the corporation was created, testimony 
that a company was a corporation organized mi- J 
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BOND ET AL. v. FLOYD BT AL. 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA. 
No. 87. Argued November 10, 1966.—Decided December 5, 1966. 
Several months after the election in June 1965 to the Georgia House 
of Representatives of appellant Bond, a Negro, a civil rights 
organization of which he was a staff member issued an anti-war 
statement against the Government's Vietnam policy and the 
operation of the Selective Service laws. Bond endorsed the state-
ment in a news interview stating among other things that as "a 
second class citizen" he was not required to support the war, as 
a pacifist he was opposed to all war, and he saw nothing incon-
sistent with his statement and his taking the oath of office. House 
members in petitions challenged Bond's right to be seated, charg-
ing that his statements aided our enemies, violated the Selective 
Service laws, discredited the House, and were inconsistent with 
the legislator's mandatory oath to support the Constitution. Fol-
lowing the House clerk's refusal to seat him, Bond, manifesting 
willingness to take the oath, challenged the petitions as depriving 
him of his First Amendment rights and being racially motivated. 
At a House committee hearing Bond amplified his views and 
denied having urged draft card burning or other law violations. 
Following the hearing, the committee concluded that Bond should 
not be seated and the House thereafter refused to seat him. Bond 
brought this action in District Court for injunctive relief and a 
declaratory judgment. The District Court, holding that it had 
jurisdiction to decide the constitutional issue, concluded that Bond 
had been accorded procedural due process through the hearing. 
I t also held that the House had a rational basis for concluding that 
Bond's remarks exceeded criticism of national policy and that he 
could not in good faith take an oath to support the State and 
Federal Constitutions and thus could not meet a qualification for 
membership which the House had the power to impose. While 
Bond's appeal to this Court under 28 U. 'S . C. § 1253 from that 
decision was pending he was again elected as a Representative, in 
a special election. He was rejected by the House Rules Committee 
BOND v. FLOYD. 117 
116 Syllabus. 
when he declined to recant, and later was elected again, in the 
regular 1966 primary and general elections. Held: 
1. This Court has jurisdiction to determine whether a disqualifi-
cation for the office of state legislator under color of a proper 
constitutional standard violates First Amendment rights. P. 131. 
2. In disqualifying Bond because of his statements the State 
violated the First Amendment made applicable to the States by the 
Fourteenth. Pp. 131-137. 
(a) A majority of state legislators is not authorized to test 
the sincerity with which another duly elected legislator meets the 
requirement for holding office of swearing to support the Federal 
and State Constitutions. P. 132. 
(b) The State may not apply to a legislator a First Amend-
ment standard stricter than that applicable to a private citizen. 
Pp. 132-133. 
(c) Bond's statements do not show an incitement to violate 
the Selective Service statute's prohibition of counselling against 
registration for military service. Pp. 133-134. 
(d) Though a State may impose an oath requirement on legis-
lators it cannot limit their capacity to express views on local or 
national policy. "[DJebate on public issues should be uninhibited, 
robust, and wide-open." New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 
254, 270. Pp. 135-136. 
251 F. Supp. 333, reversed. 
Howard Moore, Jr., and Leonard B. Boudin argued the 
cause for appellants. With them on the briefs was 
Victor Rabinowitz. 
Arthur K. Bolton, Attorney General of Georgia, 
argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief 
were William L. Harper and Alfred L. Evans, Jr., Assist-
ant Attorneys General, and Paul L. Homes, Deputy 
Assistant Attorney General. 
Briefs of amid curiae, urging reversal, were filed by 
Robert L. Carter for the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People; Melvin L. Wulj and 
118 OCTOBER TERM, 1966. 
Opinion of the Court. 385 U. S. 
Charles Morgan, Jr., for the American Civil Liberties 
Union et al.; and by Joseph B. Robison for the American 
Jewish Congress. 
MR. C H I E F JUSTICE WARREN delivered the opinion of 
the Court. 
The question presented in this case is whether the 
Georgia House of Representatives may constitutionally 
exclude appellant Bond, a duly elected Representative, 
from membership because of his statements, and state-
ments to which he subscribed, criticizing the policy of 
the Federal Government in Vietnam and the operation 
of the Selective Service laws. An understanding of the 
circumstances of the litigation requires a complete pres-
entation of the events and statements which led to this 
appeal. 
Bond, a Negro, was elected on June 15, 1965, as the 
Representative to the Georgia House of Representatives 
from the 136th House District. Of the District's 6,500 
voters, approximately 6,000 are Negroes. Bond defeated 
his opponent, Malcolm Dean, Dean of Men at Atlanta 
University, also a Negro, by a vote of 2,320 to 487. 
On January 6, 1966, the Student Nonviolent Coordi-
nating Committee, a civil rights organization of which 
Bond was then the Communications Director, issued the 
following statement on American policy in Vietnam and 
its relation to the work of civil rights organizations in 
this country: 
"The Student Nonviolent Coordinating Commit-
tee has a right and a responsibility to dissent with 
United States foreign policy on an issue when it 
sees fit. The Student Nonviolent Coordinating 
Committee now states its opposition to United 
States' involvement in Viet Nam on these grounds: 
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"We believe the United States government has 
been deceptive in its claims of concern for freedom 
of the Vietnamese people, just as the government 
has been deceptive in claiming concern for the 
freedom of colored people in such other countries 
as the Dominican Republic, the Congo, South Africa, 
Rhodesia and in the United States itself. 
"We, the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Com-
mittee, have been involved in the black people's 
struggle for liberation and self-determination in this 
country for the past five years. Our work, particu-
larly in the South, has taught us that the United 
States government has never guaranteed the free-
dom of oppressed citizens, and is not yet truly deter-
mined to end the rule of terror and oppression within 
its own borders. 
"We ourselves have often been victims of violence 
and confinement executed by United States govern-
ment officials. We recall the numerous persons who 
have been murdered in the South because of their 
efforts to secure their civil and human rights, and 
whose murderers have been allowed to escape pen-
alty for their crimes. 
"The murder of Samuel Young in Tuskegee, Ala., 
is no different than the murder of peasants in Viet 
Nam, for both Young and the Vietnamese sought, 
and are seeking, to secure the rights guaranteed 
them by law. In each case the United States gov-
ernment bears a great part of the responsibility for 
these deaths. 
"Samuel Young was murdered because United 
States law is not being enforced. Vietnamese are 
murdered because the United States is pursuing an 
aggressive policy in violation of international law. 
The United States is no respecter of persons or law 
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when such persons or laws run counter to its needs 
and desires. 
"We recall the indifference, suspicion and outright 
hostility with which our reports of violence have 
been met in the past by government officials. 
"We know that for the most part, elections in 
this country, in the North as well as the South, are 
not free. We have seen that the 1965 Voting Rights 
Act and the 1964 Civil Rights Act have not yet 
been implemented with full federal power and 
sincerity. 
"We question, then, the ability and even the de-
sire of the United States government to guarantee 
free elections abroad. We maintain that our coun-
try's cry of 'preserve freedom in the world' is a 
hypocritical mask behind which it squashes libera-
tion movements which are not bound, and refuse 
to be bound, by the expediencies of United States 
cold war policies. 
"We are in sympathy with, and support, the men 
in this country who are unwilling to respond to a 
military draft which would compel them to con-
tribute their lives to United States aggression in 
Viet Nam in the name of the 'freedom' we find so 
false in this country. 
"We recoil with horror at the inconsistency of 
a supposedly 'free' society where responsibility to 
freedom is equated with the responsibility to lend 
oneself to military aggression. We take note of the 
fact that 16 per cent of the draftees from this coun-
try are Negroes called on to stifle the liberation of 
Viet Nam, to preserve a 'democracy' which does not 
exist for them at home. 
"We ask, where is the draft for the freedom fight 
in the United States? 
BOND v. FLOYD. 121 
116 Opinion of the Court. 
"We therefore encourage those Americans who 
prefer to use their energy in building democratic 
forms within this country. We believe that work 
in the civil rights movement and with other human 
relations organizations is a valid alternative to the 
draft. We urge all Americans to seek this alterna-
tive, knowing full well that it may cost their lives— 
as painfully as in Viet Nam." 
On the same day that this statement was issued, Bond 
was interviewed by telephone by a reporter from a local 
radio station, and, although Bond had not participated 
in drafting the statement, he endorsed the statement in 
these words: 
"Why, I endorse it, first, because I like to think 
of myself as a pacifist and one who opposes that 
war and any other war and eager and anxious to 
encourage people not to participate in it for any 
reason that they choose; and secondly, I agree with 
this statement because of the reason set forth in it— 
because I think it is sorta hypocritical for us to 
maintain that we are fighting for liberty in other 
places and we are not guaranteeing liberty to citizens 
inside the continental United States. 
"Well, I think that the fact that the United States 
Government fights a war in Viet Nam, I don't think 
that I as a second class citizen of the United States 
have a requirement to support that war. I think 
my responsibility is to oppose things that I think 
are wrong if they are in Viet Nam or New York, or 
Chicago, or Atlanta, or wherever." 
When the interviewer suggested that our involvement 
in Vietnam was because "if we do not stop Communism 
233-653 O - 67 - 15 
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there that it is just a question of where will we stop it 
next," Bond replied: 
"Oh, no, I'm not taking a stand against stopping 
World Communism, and I'm not taking a stand in 
favor of the Viet Cong. What I'm saying that is, 
first, that I don't believe in that war. That partic-
ular war. I'm against all war. I'm against that 
war in particular, and I don't think people ought to 
participate in it. Because I'm against war, I'm 
against the draft. I think that other countries in 
the World get along without a draft—England is 
one—and I don't see why we couldn't, too. 
". . . I'm not about to justify that war, because 
it's stopping International Communism, or what-
ever—you know, I just happen to have a basic 
disagreement with wars for whatever reason they 
are fought— . . . [F] ought to stop International 
Communism, to promote International Communism, 
or for whatever reason. I oppose the Viet Cong 
fighting in Viet Nam as much as I oppose the United 
States fighting in Viet Nam. I happen to live in the 
United States. If I lived in North Viet Nam I 
might not have the same sort of freedom of expres-
sion, but it happens that I live here—not there." 
The interviewer also asked Bond if he felt he could 
take the oath of office required by the Georgia Consti-
tution, and Bond responded that he saw nothing incon-
sistent between his statements and the oath. Bond was 
also asked whether he would adhere to his statements if 
war were declared on North Vietnam and if his state-
ments might become treasonous. He replied that he did 
not know "if I'm strong enough to place myself in a 
position where I'd be guilty of treason." 
BOND v. FLOYD. 123 
116 Opinion of the Court. 
Before January 10, 1966, when the Georgia House of 
Representatives was scheduled to convene, petitions chal-
lenging Bond's right to be seated were filed by 75 House 
members. These petitions charged that Bond's state-
ments gave aid and comfort to the enemies of the United 
States and Georgia, violated the Selective Service laws, 
and tended to bring discredit and disrespect on the House. 
The petitions further contended that Bond's endorsement 
of the SNCC statement "is totally and completely repug-
nant to and inconsistent with the mandatory oath pre-
scribed by the Constitution of Georgia for a Member of 
the House of Representatives to take before taking his 
seat." For the same reasons, the petitions asserted that 
Bond could not take an oath to support the Constitution 
of the United States. When Bond appeared at the 
House on January 10 to be sworn in, the clerk refused 
to administer the oath to him until the issues raised in 
the challenge petitions had been decided. 
Bond filed a response to the challenge petitions in which 
he stated his willingness to take the oath and argued 
that he was not unable to do so in good faith. He further 
argued that the challenge against his seating had been 
filed to deprive him of his First Amendment rights, and 
that the challenge was racially motivated. A special 
committee was appointed to report on the challenge, and 
a hearing was held to determine exactly what Bond had 
said and the intentions with which he had said it. 
At this hearing, the only testimony given against Bond 
was that which he himself gave the committee. Both, the 
opponents Bond had defeated in becoming the Repre-
sentative of the 136th District testified to his good char-
acter and to his loyalty to the United States. A record-
ing of the interview which Bond had given to the reporter 
after the SNCC statement was played, and Bond was 
called to the stand for cross-examination. He there ad-
mitted his statements and elaborated his views. He 
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stated that he concurred in the SNCC statement "without 
reservation," and, when asked if he admired the courage 
of persons who burn their draft cards, responded: 
"I admire people who take an action, and I admire 
people who feel strongly enough about their con-
victions to take an action like that knowing the 
consequences that they will face, and that was my 
original statement when asked that question. 
"I have never suggested or counseled or advocated 
that any one other person burn their draft card. 
In fact, I have mine in my pocket and will produce 
it if you wish. I do not advocate that people should 
break laws. What I simply try to say was that I 
admired the courage of someone who could act on 
his convictions knowing that he faces pretty stiff 
consequences." 
Tapes of an interview Bond had given the press after 
the clerk had refused to give him the oath were also 
heard by the special committee. In this interview, Bond 
stated : 
"I stand before you today charged with entering 
into public discussion on matters of National in-
terest. I hesitate to offer explanations for my ac-
tions or deeds where no charge has been levied 
against me other than the charge that I have chosen 
to speak my mind and no explanation is called for, 
for no member of this House, has ever, to my knowl-
edge, been called upon to explain his public state-
ments for public postures as a prerequisite to 
admission to that Body. I therefore, offer to my 
constituents a statement of my views. I have not 
counselled burning draft cards, nor have I burned 
mine. I have suggested that congressionally out-
lined alternatives to military service be extended to 
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building democracy at home. The posture of my 
life for the past five years has been calculated to 
give Negroes the ability to participate in formulation 
of public policies. The fact of my election to public 
office does not lessen my duty or desire to express 
my opinions even when they differ from those held 
by others. As to the current controversy because 
of convictions that I have arrived at through exam-
ination of my conscience I have decided I personally 
cannot participate in war. 
"I stand here with intentions to take an oath— 
that oath they just took in there—that will dispel 
any doubts about my convictions or loyalty." 
The special committee gave general approval in its re-
port to the specific charges in the challenge petitions that 
Bond's endorsement of the SNCC statement and his 
supplementary remarks showed that he "does not and 
will not" support the Constitutions of the United States 
and of Georgia, that he "adheres to the enemies of 
the . . . State of Georgia" contrary to the State Consti-
tution, that he gives aid and comfort to the enemies of 
the United States, that his statements violated the Uni-
versal Military Training and Service Act, § 12, 62 Stat. 
622, 50 U. S. C. App. § 462, and that his statements "are 
reprehensible and are such as tend to bring discredit to 
and disrespect of the House." On the same day the 
House adopted the committee report without findings 
and without further elaborating Bond's lack of qualifica-
tions, and resolved by a vote of 184 to 12 that "Bond 
shall not be allowed to take the oath of office as a mem-
ber of the House of Representatives and that Repre-
sentative-Elect Julian Bond shall not be seated as a 
member of the House of Representatives." 
Bond then instituted an action in the District Court 
for the Northern District of Georgia for injunctive re-
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lief and a declaratory judgment that the House action 
was unauthorized by the Georgia Constitution and vio-
lated Bond's rights under the First Amendment. A 
three-judge District Court was convened under 28 
U. S. C. §2281. All three members of the District 
Court held that the court had jurisdiction to decide the 
constitutionality of the House action because Bond had 
asserted substantial First Amendment rights.1 On the 
merits, however, the court was divided. 
Judges Bell and Morgan, writing for the majority of 
the court, addressed themselves first to the question of 
whether the Georgia House had power under state law 
to disqualify Bond based on its conclusion that he could 
not sincerely take the oath of office. They reasoned that 
separation-of-powers principles gave the Legislature 
power to insist on qualifications in addition to those 
specified in the State Constitution. The majority 
pointed out that nothing in the Georgia Constitution 
limits the qualifications of the legislators to those 
expressed in the constitution. 
Having concluded that the action of the Georgia 
House was authorized by state law, the court considered 
whether Bond's disqualification violated his constitu-
tional right of freedom of speech. I t reasoned that the 
decisions of this Court involving particular state politi-
cal offices supported an attitude of restraint in which 
the principles of separation of powers and federalism 
should be balanced against the alleged deprivation of 
individual constitutional rights. On this basis, the ma-
jority below fashioned the test to be applied in this case 
as being whether the refusal to seat Bond violated pro-
cedural or what it termed substantive due process. The 
court held that the hearing which had been given Bond 
by the House satisfied procedural due process. As for 
^
 xThe opinion of the District Court is reported at 251 F. Supp. 
^333 (1966). 
BOND v. FLOYD. 127 
116 Opinion of the Court. 
what it termed the question of substantive due process, 
the majority concluded that there was a rational eviden-
tiary basis for the ruling of the House. It reasoned that 
Bond's right to dissent as a private citizen was limited 
by his decision to seek membership in the Georgia House. 
Moreover, the majority concluded, the SNCC statement 
and Bond's related remarks went beyond criticism of 
national policy and provided a rational basis for a con-
clusion that the speaker could not in good faith take an 
oath to support the State and Federal Constitutions: 
"A citizen would not violate his oath by objecting 
to or criticizing this policy or even by calling it 
deceptive and false as the statement did. 
"But the statement does not stop with this. It 
is a call to action based on race; a call alien to the 
concept of the pluralistic society which makes this 
nation. I t aligns the organization with '. . . colored 
people in such other countries as the Dominican 
Republic, the Congo, South Africa, Rhodesia . . . / 
I t refers to its involvement in the black people's 
struggle for liberation and self-determination . . . / 
It states that 'Vietnamese are murdered because the 
United States is pursuing an aggressive policy in 
violation of international law.' I t alleges that 
Negroes, referring to American servicemen, are 
called on to stifle the liberation of Viet Nam. 
"The call to action, and this is what we find to 
be a rational basis for the decision which denied 
Mr. Bond his seat, is that language which states 
that SNCC supports those men in this country who 
are unwilling to respond to a military draft." 2 
Chief Judge Tuttle dissented.3 He reasoned that the 
question of the power of the Georgia House under the 
2
 Id., at 344. 
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State Constitution to disqualify a Representative under 
these circumstances had never been decided by the state 
courts, and that federal courts should construe state law, 
if possible, so as to avoid unnecessary federal constitu-
tional issues. Since Bond satisfied all the stated quali-
fications in the State Constitution, Chief Judge Tuttle 
concluded that his disqualification was beyond the power 
of the House as a matter of state constitutional law. 
Bond appealed directly to this Court from the deci-
sion of the District Court under 28 U. S. C. § 1253. 
While this appeal was pending, the Governor of Georgia 
called a special election to fill the vacancy caused by 
Bond's exclusion. Bond entered this election and won 
overwhelmingly. The House was in recess, but the Rules 
Committee held a hearing in which Bond declined to re-
cant his earlier statements. Consequently, he was again 
prevented from taking the oath of office, and the seat 
has remained vacant. Bond again sought the seat from 
the 136th District in the regular 1966 election, and he 
won the Democratic primary in September 1966, and 
won an overwhelming majority in the election of Novem-
ber 8, 1966.4 
The Georgia Constitution sets out a number of specific 
provisions dealing with the qualifications and eligibility 
of state legislators. These provide that Representatives 
shall be citizens of the United States, at least 21 years 
of age, citizens of Georgia for two years, and residents 
for one year of the counties from which elected.5 The 
4
 A question was raised in oral argument as to whether this case 
might not be moot since the session of the House which excluded 
Bond was no longer in existence. The State has not pressed this 
argument, and it could not do so, because the State has stipulated 
that if Bond succeeds on this appeal he will receive back salary 
for the term from which he was excluded. 
V> Georgia Const,, Art. 3, § 6 (§2-1801, Ga. Code Ann.), 
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Georgia Constitution further provides that no one con-
victed of treason against the State, or of any crime of 
moral turpitude, or of a number of other enumerated 
crimes may hold any office in the State.6 Idiots and 
insane persons are barred from office,7 and no one hold-
ing any state or federal office is eligible for a seat in 
either house.8 The State Constitution also provides: 
"Election, returns, etc.; disorderly conduct.— 
Each House shall be the judge of the election, 
returns, and qualifications of its members and shall 
have power to punish them for disorderly behavior, 
or misconduct, by censure, fine, imprisonment, or 
expulsion; but no member shall be expelled, except 
by a vote of two-thirds of the House to which he 
belongs." 9 
These constitute the only stated qualifications for mem-
bership in the Georgia Legislature and the State concedes 
that Bond meets all of them. The Georgia Constitution 
also requires Representatives to take an oath stated in 
the Constitution: 
"Oath of members.—Each senator and Repre-
sentative, before taking his seat, shall take the 
following oath, or affirmation, to-wit: 'I will support 
the Constitution of this State and of the United 
States, and on all questions and measures which may 
come before me, I will so conduct myself, as will, in 
my judgment, be most conducive to the interests and 
prosperity of this State/ " 10 
6
 Georgia Const., Art, 2, § 2 (§2-801, Ga. Code Ann.). 
7
 Ibid. 
8
 Georgia Const., Art, 3, § 4 (§2-1606, Ga. Code Ann.). 
9
 Georgia Const., Art. 3, § 7 (§2-1901, Ga. Code Ann.). 
10
 Georgia Const., Art. 3, §4 (§2-1605, Ga. Code Ann.). 
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The State points out in its brief that the latter part of 
this oath, involving the admonition to act in the best 
interests of the State, was not the standard by which 
Bond was judged. 
The State does not claim that Bond refused to take 
the oath to support the Federal Constitution, a require-
ment imposed on state legislators by Art. VI, cl. 3, of 
the United States Constitution: 
"The Senators and Representatives before men-
tioned, and the Members of the several State Legis-
latures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both 
of the United States and of the several States, shall 
be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this 
Constitution; but no religious Tests shall ever be 
required as a Qualification to any Office or public 
Trust under the United States." 
Instead, it argues that the oath provisions of the State 
and Federal Constitutions constitute an additional quali-
fication. Because under state law the legislature has 
exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether an elected 
Representative meets the enumerated qualifications, it 
is argued that the legislature has power to look beyond 
the plain meaning of the oath provisions which merely 
require that the oaths be taken. This additional power 
is said to extend to determining whether a given Repre-
sentative may take the oath with sincerity. The State 
does not claim that it should be completely free of judi-
cial review whenever it disqualifies an elected Repre-
sentative ; it admits that, if a State Legislature excluded 
a legislator on racial or other clearly unconstitutional 
grounds, the federal (or state) judiciary would be justi-. 
fied in testing the exclusion by federal constitutional 
standards.11 But the State argues that there can be no 
11
 See Gomillion v. Lightjoot, 364 U. S. 339 (1960), in which the 
C$urt stated: "When a State exercises power wholly within the 
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doubt as to the constitutionality of the qualification 
involved in this case because it is one imposed on the 
State Legislatures by Article VI of the United States 
Constitution. Moreover, the State contends that no de-
cision of this Court suggests that a State may not ensure 
the loyalty of its public servants by making the taking 
of an oath a qualification of office. Thus the State 
argues that there should be no judicial review of the 
legislature's power to judge whether a prospective mem-
ber may conscientiously take the oath required by the 
State and Federal Constitutions. 
We are not persuaded by the State's attempt to dis-
tinguish, for purposes of our jurisdiction, between an 
exclusion alleged to be on racial grounds and one alleged 
to violate the First Amendment. The basis for the 
argued distinction is that, in this case, Bond's disqualifi-
cation was grounded on a constitutional standard—the 
requirement of taking an oath to support the Constitu-
tion. But Bond's contention is that this standard was 
utilized to infringe his First Amendment rights, and we 
cannot distinguish, for purposes of our assumption of 
jurisdiction, between a disqualification under an uncon-
stitutional standard and a disqualification which, al-
though under color of a proper standard, is alleged to 
violate the First Amendment. 
We conclude as did the entire court below that this 
Court has jurisdiction to review the question of whether 
the action of the Georgia House of Representatives de-
prived Bond of federal constitutional rights, and we now 
move to the central question posed in the case—whether 
Bond's disqualification because of his statements violated 
domain of state interest, it is insulated from federal judicial review. 
But such insulation is not carried over when state power is used 
as an instrument for circumventing a federally protected right." 
364 U. S., at 347. 
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the free speech provisions of the First Amendment as 
applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The State argues that the exclusion does not violate 
the First Amendment because the State has a right, 
under Article VI of the United States Constitution, to 
insist on loyalty to the Constitution as a condition of 
office. A legislator of course can be required to swear 
to support the Constitution of the United States as a 
condition of holding office, but that is not the issue in 
this case, as the record is uncontradicted that Bond has 
repeatedly expressed his willingness to swear to the oaths 
provided for in the State and Federal Constitutions. 
Nor is this a case where a legislator swears to an oath 
pro forma while declaring or manifesting his disagree-
ment with or indifference to the oath. Thus, we do not 
quarrel with the State's contention that the oath provi-
sions of the United States and Georgia Constitutions do 
not violate the First Amendment. But this requirement 
does not authorize a majority of state legislators to test 
the sincerity with which another duly elected legislator 
can swear to uphold the Constitution. Such a power 
could be utilized to restrict the right of legislators to 
dissent from national or state policy or that of a majority 
of their colleagues under the guise of judging their loy-
alty to the Constitution. Certainly there can be no ques-
tion but that the First Amendment protects expressions 
in opposition to national foreign policy in Vietnam and 
to the Selective Service system. The State does not 
contend otherwise. But it argues that Bond went be-
yond expressions of opposition, and counseled violations 
of the Selective Service laws, and that advocating viola-
tion of federal law demonstrates a lack of support for 
the Constitution. The State declines to argue that 
Bond's statements would violate any law if made by a 
private citizen, but it does argue that even though such 
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a citizen might be protected by his First Amendment 
rights, the State may nonetheless apply a stricter stand-
ard to its legislators. We do not agree. 
Bond could not have been constitutionally convicted 
under 50 U. S. C. App. §462 (a), which punishes any 
person who "counsels, aids, or abets another to refuse or 
evade registration/'12 Bond's statements were at worst 
unclear on the question of the means to be adopted to 
avoid the draft. While the SNCC statement said "We 
are in sympathy with, and support, the men in this 
country who are unwilling to respond to a military draft/' 
this statement alone cannot be interpreted as a call to 
unlawful refusal to be drafted. Moreover, Bond's supple-
mentary statements tend to resolve the opaqueness in 
favor of legal alternatives to the draft, and there is no 
evidence to the contrary. On the day the statement was 
issued, Bond explained that he endorsed it "because I 
like to think of myself as a pacifist and one who opposes 
that war and any other war and eager and anxious to 
12
 The pertinent provisions of §462 (a) are as follows: 
"[A]ny person who shall knowingly make, or be a party to the 
making, of any false statement or certificate regarding or bearing 
upon a classification or in support of any request for a particular 
classification, for service under the provisions of this title . . . , or 
rules, regulations, or directions made pursuant thereto, or who other-
wise evades or refuses registration or service in the armed forces 
or any of the requirements of this title . . . , or who knowingly 
counsels, aids, or abets another to refuse or evade registration or 
service in the armed forces or any of the requirements of this 
title . . . , or of said rules, regulations, or directions, . . . or any 
person or persons who shall knowingly hinder or interfere or attempt 
to do so in any way, by force or violence or otherwise, with the 
administration of this title . . . or the rules or regulations made 
pursuant thereto, or who conspires to commit any one or more of 
such offenses, shall, upon conviction in any district court of the 
United States of competent jurisdiction, be punished by imprison-
ment for not more than five years or a fine of not more than $10,000, 
or by both such fine and imprisonment . . . ." 
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encourage people not to participate in it for any reason 
that they choose." In the same interview, Bond stated 
categorically that he did not oppose the Vietnam policy 
because he favored the Communists; that he was a loyal 
American citizen and supported the Constitution of the 
United States. He further stated "I oppose the Viet 
Cong fighting in Viet Nam as much as I oppose the 
United States fighting in Viet Nam." At the hearing 
before the Special Committee of the Georgia House, 
when asked his position on persons who burned their 
draft cards, Bond replied that he admired the courage 
of persons who "feel strongly enough about their con-
victions to take an action like that knowing the con-
sequences that they will face." When pressed as to 
whether his admiration was based on the violation of 
federal law, Bond stated: 
"I have never suggested or counseled or advocated 
that any one other person burn their draft card. In 
fact, I have mine in my pocket and will produce it 
if you wish. I do not advocate that people should 
break laws. What I simply try to say was that I 
admired the courage of someone who could act on 
his convictions knowing that he faces pretty stiff 
consequences." 
Certainly this clarification does not demonstrate any 
incitement to violation of law. No useful purpose would 
be served by discussing the many decisions of this Court 
which establish that Bond could not have been convicted 
for these statements consistently with the First Amend-
ment. See, e. g., Wood v. Georgia, 370 U. S. 375 (1962); 
Yates v. United States, 354 U. S. 298 (1957); Terminiello 
v. Chicago, 337 U. S. 1 (1949). Nor does the fact that 
the District Court found the SNCC statement to have 
racial overtones constitute a reason for holding it out-
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side the protection of the First Amendment. In fact 
the State concedes that there is no issue of race in the 
case. 
The State attempts to circumvent the protection the 
First Amendment would afford to these statements if 
made by a private citizen by arguing that a State is 
constitutionally justified in exacting a higher standard 
of loyalty from its legislators than from its citizens. Of 
course, a State may constitutionally require an oath to 
support the Constitution from its legislators which it 
does not require of its private citizens. But this dif-
ference in treatment does not support the exclusion of 
Bond, for while the State has an interest in requiring 
its legislators to swear to a belief in constitutional proc-
esses of government, surely the oath gives it no interest 
in limiting its legislators' capacity to discuss their views 
of local or national policy.13 The manifest function of 
13
 Madison and Hamilton anticipated the oppressive effect on 
freedom of expression which would result if the legislature could 
utilize its power of judging qualifications to pass judgment on a 
legislator's political views. At the Constitutional Convention of 
1787, Madison opposed a proposal to give to Congress power to 
establish qualifications in general. Warren, The Making of the 
Constitution 420-422 (1937). The Journal of the Federal Con-
vention of 1787 states: 
"Mr. Madison was opposed to the Section as vesting an improper 
& dangerous power in the Legislature. The qualifications of 
electors and elected were fundamental articles in a Republican Govt, 
and ought to be fixed by the Constitution. If the Legislature could 
regulate those of either, it can by degrees subvert the Constitu-
tion. . . . Qualifications founded on artificial distinctions may be 
devised, by the stronger in order to keep out partizans of a weaker 
faction. 
"Mr. Madison observed that the British Parliamt. possessed the 
power of regulating the qualifications both of the electors, and the 
elected; and the abuse they had made of it was a lesson worthy 
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the First Amendment in a representative government 
requires that legislators be given the widest latitude to 
express their views on issues of policy. The central com-
mitment of the First Amendment, as summarized in the 
opinion of the Court in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 
376 U. S. 254, 270 (1964), is that "debate on public 
issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open." 
We think the rationale of the New York Times case dis-
poses of the claim that Bond's statements fell outside the 
range of constitutional protection. Just as erroneous 
statements must be protected to give freedom of expres-
sion the breathing space it needs to survive, so statements 
criticizing public policy and the implementation of it 
must be similarly protected. The State argues that the 
New York Times principle should not be extended to 
statements by a legislator because the policy of encour-
aging free debate about governmental operations only 
applies to the citizen-critic of his government. We find 
no support for this distinction in the New York Times 
case or in any other decision of this Court. The interest 
of the public in hearing all sides of a public issue is 
hardly advanced by extending more protection to citizen-
critics than to legislators. Legislators have an obliga-
tion to take positions on controversial political questions 
so that their constituents can be fully informed by them, 
and be better able to assess their qualifications for office ; 
also so they may be represented in governmental debates 
of our attention. They had made the changes in both cases sub-
servient to their own views, or to the views of political or Religious 
parties." 2 Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention of 
1787, pp. 249-250 (Aug. 10, 1787). 
Hamilton agreed with Madison that : 
"The qualifications of the persons who may choose or be 
chosen . . . are defined and fixed in the constitution; and are un-
alterable by the legislature." The Federalist, No. 60, p. 409 (Cooke 
ed 1961). 
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by the person they have elected to represent them. We 
therefore hold that the disqualification of Bond from 
membership in the Georgia House because of his state-
ments violated Bond's right of free expression under the 
First Amendment. Because of our disposition of the 
case on First Amendment grounds, we need not decide 
the other issues advanced by Bond and the amici.1* 
The judgment of the District Court is 
Reversed. 
14
 Bond argues that the action of the Georgia House was not 
authorized by state law, that if the State Constitution allows this 
exclusion it does so pursuant to an oath which is unconstitutionally 
vague, that the exclusion was based on statements protected by the 
First Amendment, and that the exclusion is a bill of attainder and 
an ex post facto law. In addition, amicus briefs filed in support of 
appellant Bond add the arguments that the decision not to seat him 
was inextricably involved with race prejudice and that it violated 
the guarantee of a republican form of government clause. 
Similarly, we need not pass on the standing of two of Bond'b 
constituents who joined in the suit below. The majority below 
dismissed the complaint as to these two constituents because they 
lacked a sufficiently direct interest in the controversy as would give 
them standing. The majority noted that it was appropriate to 
dismiss the case as to Bond's constituents because Bond's complaint 
would resolve every issue necessary to a decision in the case. We 
express no opinion on the question of whether Bond's constituents 
can claim that concrete adverseness which would be necessary to 
give them standing. 
